The past decade and a half has witnessed a dramatic development and expansion of European activism and a string of notable judicial victories for equality advocates, 7 the condition of European antidiscrimination law and policy today-despite Europe's economic and financial woes-seems energetic and the outlook optimistic.
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In contrast with this depiction of vitality and optimism, the landscape of U.S. antidiscrimination law today presents a more somber picture. The socially transformative energy of the U.S. civil rights movement of the 1960s seems to have been drained and the powerful corpus of constitutional and federal antidiscrimination law that it brought with it has been significantly weakened following decades of political and legal backlash. The courts have become an arena for social and ideological conflict as different groups and interests have mobilized to use the judiciary to contest, rather than to promote or enforce, antidiscrimination laws and programs that were intended to redress social inequity. 8 Several of the key provisions and conceptions of U.S.
antidiscrimination law with their origins in the civil rights movement have been rejected or sharply limited by state and federal judiciaries. Broad legislative definitions of disability have been judicially narrowed, 9 the "disparate impact" doctrine of discrimination has been 7 In the field of ethnic and racial equality, see, e. discrimination law borrowed heavily from the United States model, in particular from the Americans with Disabilities Act. 17 Bruno de Witte's essay, too, traces the origins of the idea of national equality bodies, which are currently proliferating across Europe, to the creation of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission by the U.S. Civil Rights Act in 1964. 18 What can then account for the fact that these related bodies of antidiscrimination law and policy, which share so many similar origins as well as key concepts and features, have apparently fared so differently-stalling in the United States while flourishing in Europe?
B. Scrutinizing the Contrast
A number of explanations could be offered to explain the apparently different fate of antidiscrimination law and policy on either side of the Atlantic. While there are many other significant differences between the United States as a federal state on the one hand, and the European Union (and the Council of Europe) as regional political and legal systems on the other, three specific kinds of explanation for the divergent trajectories of U.S. and European antidiscrimination law will be suggested here.
(i)
A first possible explanation is cultural and ideological: although the particular legal and jurisprudential seeds originated and were first sewn in the United States, it seems plausible that antidiscrimination legislation. See, at 620, "I have tried to show that Brown and its progeny-in both legislation and case law-were major stimuli for legal interventions in Britain from the 1960s and (much later) in other parts , the UN Special Rapporteur on racism, the Independent Expert on minority issues, and the Special Rapporteur on the Human rights of Migrants issued a statement expressing extreme concern about the Italian government proposal to fingerprint all Roma individuals. Human Rights Watch has drawn repeated attention to the rise in discriminatory and repressive action against the Roma people across Europe, more recently in its 2011 report: see http://www.hrw.org/world-report-2011/european-union. A further recent instance concerned the eviction of Irish travellers from their halting site in the United Kingdom, which drew condemnation from the Council of Europe Commissioner on Human Rights and the UN Committee on the elimination of racial discrimination (CERD): see http://www.guardian.co.uk/uk/2011/sep/02/dale-farm-travellerseviction-solution. 33 To give a striking example of this surge in one particular field, the European Court of Human Rights up until 2010 had given sixty-eight rulings (some on admissibility, some on the merits) on questions of racial discrimination against the Roma, of which fifty-five were given within the past ten years. 34 and sex discrimination to these other grounds, has encountered robust opposition from a range of Member States in the Council of Ministers, and after three years of inconclusive discussion the proposal seems unlikely to be adopted in the foreseeable future. 36 Similarly, in the field of EU Thus while Europe may be several decades behind the United States in the creation and development of its broad body of antidiscrimination law, its future trajectory may not be so dissimilar. In particular, it seems reasonable to assume that Europe is likely to experience some of the ideological conflict and strong political and social opposition that the United States has experienced in recent decades in relation to attempts to redress social and economic inequality through antidiscrimination law.
C. Nuancing the Analysis
At the workshop in which antidiscrimination law scholars from both Europe and North America participated, and which led to the publication of these symposium papers, the contrast between the optimism of the European scholars and the deflated spirit of the U.S. scholars about the potential of antidiscrimination law was palpable, and became a matter of discussion. Yet as the conference proceeded, a more nuanced picture and a more qualified assessment emerged, The contributions of Gerard Quinn and Eilionóir Flynn, and Bruno de Witte draw attention to the way in which key aspects of European antidiscrimination law were heavily influenced by U.S.
models. This influence, as noted above, has been the subject of previous comment and analysis in the fields of EU race discrimination and sex discrimination law. 42 More recently, scholars have analyzed the influence of U.S. civil-rights and public-interest litigation on the strategies of NGOs before European courts, including the ECtHR.
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Gerard Quinn and Eilionóir Flynn's article draws attention to the lesser known fact that EU disability discrimination law has also borrowed, albeit less directly, from the United States in this field. Despite the apparent differences between the U.S. "civil rights" model of disability discrimination as compared with the initial European "social welfare" approach, Quinn and He notes, however, that the range and diversity in the nature and tasks of the various equality institutions across different European states shows that they are far from being replicas of the original U.S. prototype, and that they are also far from converging towards a single European model.
Theme 2 -Divergence and convergence between antidiscrimination regimes:
The contributions of Julie Suk and Ruth Rubio-Marín examine how European and U.S.
antidiscrimination norms have followed distinct paths on certain issues in the field of gender equality and age, while Mark Bell's paper notes the parallel paths-similar in some respects but different in others-of the United States and the European Union in the fields of transgender and sexual orientation discrimination.
Julie Suk examines the sharp divergence between U.S. and European gender and age discrimination law as far as mandatory retirement norms and mandatory maternity leave rules are concerned. She explores the implicit theories of the state that underlie the American free-choice and anti-stereotyping arguments against such mandatory laws, as compared with the European justification of mandatory laws as a means of promoting the availability of a balanced lifestyle (whether desired or not) for all. On the one hand, the EU's approach-which accepts the compatibility of various national mandatory maternity leave and retirement regimes with EU law, and itself stipulates a minimum period of mandatory maternity leave-has been criticized for its reinforcement of stereotypes and its paternalistic generalizations as well as forcing ablebodied workers out of their chosen employment. On the other hand, the U.S. approach-which treats both mandatory maternity leave and mandatory retirement as discriminatory, and as violations of individual liberty and constitutional due process-is criticized for its implicit insistence that all citizens are able-bodied, willing and active market participants at all stages of their lives, and for neglecting the welfare and dignity especially of those individuals who are not.
In a careful analysis of both jurisdictions, Suk suggests that there are arguments to be made in favor of each model: the U.S. approach is more likely to promote individual liberty and choice, while the European approach is more likely to promote a collective conception of welfare and to counter inequalities resulting from the lack of collective action on matters like parental leave. ESC was in fact modelled on Article 14 ECHR, and notes that there has been significant convergence between the two bodies in the field of equality and antidiscrimination law.
Nevertheless, Besson's article also points out that while the European Court of Human Rights has begun to articulate an antidiscrimination jurisprudence that recognizes the notion of indirect discrimination (disparate impact doctrine, in U.S. terms), it is the European Committee on Social
Rights that has produced the more innovative and progressive decisions on discrimination and equality. In particular, the ECSR has increasingly promoted a collective approach to equality with an emphasis on the positive duties of states. Besson's analysis suggests that the differences between the approaches of the two bodies may be explained in part by reference to a number of the differences between the bodies themselves and their institutional context. A first such factor is the nature of the rights whose enforcement the two bodies are mandated to monitor, namely the more collective nature of the European Social Charter rights, as compared with the traditionally politico-civil nature of the ECHR guarantees. A second factor is the nature of the procedures before the two bodies, with the ECHR being a judicial forum receiving mainly individual complaints, while the ESC and ECSR is primarily (though not only) a report-based monitoring and data-collection system, with a more recently introduced collective complaints mechanism. There are also a larger number of states parties to the ECHR than to the relevant provisions of the ESC or RESC, and the European Social Charter has a narrower scope of application than the ECHR. It may also be that the greater inclination of the ECSR to be more demanding and far-reaching in its interpretation of the obligations of states in this respect is at least in part a function of its lack of any strong enforcement machinery, while the legitimacy and reputation of the ECHR have come to depend in part on the success of its rulings in generating state compliance, which may explain the greater caution of the Strasbourg Court. bodies would be desirable, and that each could usefully learn from aspects of the antidiscrimination jurisprudence of the other.
Luc Tremblay looks neither at Europe nor at the United States, but at a jurisdiction that many see as combining elements of both the American and the European approaches to discrimination law, namely Canada. He suggests that even within Canadian equality law, which resembles elements of the European model in its embrace of both a substantive conception of equality and the legitimacy of affirmative action, the prohibition of discrimination in Article 15(1) of the Canadian Charter also reflects something of the U.S. anti-stereotyping conception, meaning that it would invalidate certain kinds of affirmative action otherwise permitted under Article 15(2).
Canadian equality law, in his view, contains and reflects both "recognition" and "redistribution" and maintains that attempts to address socio-economic inequality through redistributive forms of affirmative action must, if they are to be compatible with the Charter, take care not to reinforce prejudices or false stereotypes, and should be assessed on the basis of proportionality. 
Theme 4: Novel approaches to combating the problems of inequity and discrimination:
The final theme of the symposium reflected in several of the papers is the emergence on both sides of the Atlantic of novel, in particular non-court-centric, approaches to the problems of exclusion, prejudice and stereotyping, as well as to the varieties of socio-economic injustice that antidiscrimination law typically seeks to address. A body of academic work in the United States has been promoting the idea of moving beyond a conventional discrimination framework to address the problems of social inequity in a more holistic and deliberative way, with less emphasis on the role of courts and litigation 46 the European Court of Justice has emphasized the collective rather than the individual dimension of equality, and has focused on the positive duties of public authorities to promote equality.
While the ECSR lacks strong enforcement mechanisms and has until now had a low profile as well as a rather modest influence, Besson suggests that its approach may over time come to influence other European equality bodies and tribunals. Bruno de Witte examines the network of equality bodies and institutions that have been established in recent years, and considers whether the data-gathering, problem-solving, awareness-raising and educational mandate of these nonjudicial fora may contribute to a less court-centric and more holistic approach. 49 Ruth Rubio-Fredman's ultimate response to the question posed early in her paper, namely whether judicial review provides an adequate external stimulus to trigger a deliberative response, and to give a voice to groups otherwise marginalized in the decision-making process, is that the duty and the standard it introduced under UK law are too open-ended to promote an equality agenda.
Nevertheless, despite this negative appraisal, she argues that one positive effect the "duty of due regard" has so far had is to provide opportunities for civil society mobilization, including through judicial review. Her article concludes with a number of suggestions for amending the legislative standard and articulating the aims of the duty in a way which could bring about substantive change in terms of actual equality.
Conclusion
At the outset of this symposium, the apparent contrast between the vigor and expansion of antidiscrimination law and policy in Europe, and the ideological conflict and narrowing of this field in the United States, seemed to call for an explanation. Further, the unquestionable influence of the United States on EU and European equality and antidiscrimination law rendered the contrast all the more worthy of note. Three possible explanations were canvassed: cultural differences between the United States and Europe in relation to the role of the state in the provision of welfare; the differences between the polarized American political system and the technocratic and elitist EU system; and finally the difference in time-the existence of several decades between the introduction and expansion of these bodies of law and policy in North
America as compared with its emergence across much of Europe. While it seems likely that each of these possible explanations has some purchase, the significance of the temporal explanation has been particularly emphasized here. In other words, while it seems clear that different cultural assumptions about the role of the state and society underpin various aspects of European and
North American antidiscrimination law and may help to explain the different paths they have taken on several key issues; and while it seems clear that the United States is both a more polarized political system and one in which elements of popular democracy are significantly stronger than within much of Europe and the European Union, it would seem both premature and unconvincing to argue that the prospects for European antidiscrimination law are much brighter and more secure than the trajectory of the United States would predict. It seems clear that political enthusiasm for the enactment of antidiscrimination measures is waning at the EU level, that there is significant pushback and resistance from political and societal forces within
European states, and that Europe's economic woes have exacerbated the kind of anti-immigrant sentiment that underlies much of Europe's particular brand of racism. Related to this is the fact that Europe's regional antidiscrimination law, that of the European Union but also of the Council of Europe and the ECHR system, is in many respects a top-down system of law and policymaking, and that even the European civil society that is engaging in litigating and enforcing EU antidiscrimination law is in many cases funded and organized by the European Union itself. All of these features suggest that Europe may be in the early stages of the unfolding of the implications of its equality law and policy, and that there may well be political resistance and significant social conflict ahead.
These comments imply that it would be rash to herald the health and success of the expanding body of European antidiscrimination law, or to accept too readily the sharply contrasting pictures of U.S. and European law with which this introduction began. The discussions that took place within this symposium, and the papers that have emerged from it, point not only to significant challenges confronting European antidiscrimination law and policy, but also to some interesting and similar sets of developments taking place within the two jurisdictions. While the entrenched conflicts within U.S. antidiscrimination law and jurisprudence have given rise to proposals to change the framework for thinking about social inequity and injustice, and to develop novel, non-court-centric ways of addressing these problems, a different set of dynamics lie behind the emergence of alternative or innovative approaches in Europe. These have less to do with U.S.-style disillusionment with conventional legal and judicial fora, and more to do with the role of regional and supranational organizations and the emergence of a range of "new governance"
approaches in Europe to deal with the complexities of a transnational regime. 50 Ultimately, even though an appraisal of the success of deliberative, non-court-centric and experimental approaches in tackling entrenched problems of social inequity requires further empirical inquiry, it would seem that both the recent history of civil rights and discrimination law in the United
States and the challenges currently confronting European social law and policy point strongly towards the desirability of such experimentation and innovation.
